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CHAPTER 10 
Conflict of Laws 
MONROE INKER 
§lO.l. Bills and notes: Which law governs. In Shapiro v. Sioux 
City Dressed Beef, Inc.,! the defendant beef company deposited a draft, 
drawn on a Boston firm, in its checking account in the defendant bank 
in Iowa. The deposit slip contained the usual provisions that the bank 
acted only "as depositor's collecting agent. . .. [A]ll items are credited 
subject to final payment. . .. [T]his bank may charge back . . . any 
item drawn on this bank which is ascertained to be drawn against in-
sufficient funds or otherwise not good or payable." The bank immedi-
ately credited the account and defendant drew on the credit. The 
draft was forwarded for collection to a Boston bank which, upon re-
ceipt of payment from the drawee, was served as trustee with a writ in 
an action of trustee process, brought by the plaintiff against the de-
fendant beef company. The defendant bank was admitted as a party.2 
In reversing the Superior Court, the Supreme Judicial Court held that 
Iowa law governed the question of ownership of the funds, and that, 
under that law, the bank was a purchaser of the draft, regardless of the 
terms of the deposit slip. 
It is settled Massachusetts law that the depository bank becomes 
merely an agent for collection3 until the depositor draws on the ad-
vanced credit, whereupon a lien is created in favor of the bank for any 
amount due it from the depositor, and the bank becomes a holder for 
value of the note.4 Iowa law, on the other hand, considers an advance 
on an uncollected negotiable instrument as a termination of the princi-
pal-agent relationship and the bank becomes a purchaser.5 
The principal Massachusetts case on the "place of making" theory is 
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§IO.l. ! 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1031, 151 N.E.2d 492. 
2 Under G.L., c. 246, §33. 
3 American Barrel Co. v. Commissioner of Banks, 290 Mass. 174, 195 N.E. 335 
(1934). 
4 For an excellent discussion of the commercial aspects of this case, see Universal 
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank and Trust Co., 161 F. Supp. 790 (D. Mass. 
1958), wherein Judge Wyzanski summarizes the interpretations of these deposit slip 
terms throughout the country. 
5 Note, Banks as Purchasers of Deposited Negotiable Items, 19 Iowa L. Rev. 338 
(1933). 
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Thomas G. Jewett, Jr., Inc. v. Keystone Driller CO.,6 which involved a 
conditional sales agreement, executed in Massachusetts, between a 
Pennsylvania corporation, through a local agent, and a Massachusetts 
corporation, with New Hampshire designated as place of delivery. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, after deciding that New Hampshire was 
the place of delivery, not of performance, held that Massachusetts law 
governed the nature, validity and interpretation of the contract, as the 
place where the contract was made. 
Although the cases are infrequent, Massachusetts has previously ap-
plied this rule to the transfer and endorsement of negotiable instru-
ments. In Brooks v. Bigelow7 the Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
law of the place of deposit governed as to title, once that law was placed 
into evidence. Thus, the law of the state where the deposit was made 
will govern as to that transaction,8 although the rights and liabilities of 
the parties to a check are governed by the law of the place where the 
check is made payable. The liability of each bank in a chain of cor-
respondent banks engaged in the collection of commercial paper is 
fixed by the law of the state wherein it conducts its business.9 
§IO.2. Divorce by estoppel. Under our system of law, jurisdiction, 
the judicial power to grant a divorce, is dependent upon the domicile 
of the parties.1 Thus when neither party to the marriage has been 
domiciled in the state, the courts of which are resorted to for divorce, 
the decree rendered by this court would be subject to direct attack as 
void for want of jurisdiction.2 
Dennis v. Dennis3 was a petition to vacate a decree of divorce which 
had been entered against the petitioner nine years before. Mrs. Den-
nis, the petitioner, and her husband had been married in New York 
and had lived there during their entire married life. In 1946 Dennis 
came to Massachusetts and filed a libel for divorce against the peti-
tioner alleging desertion. The petitioner was served in New York and 
filed an answer denying the alleged desertion. She was represented by 
counsel and was physically present in the courtroom when her husband 
falsely testified that he had resided in Massachusetts for the five years 
last preceding the date of the filing of the libel. He had in fact, as the 
petitioner well knew, never resided in this Commonwealth, but the 
petitioner remained silent and did not interpose any objections to the 
granting of a decree nisi to her husband. She was awarded custody of 
6282 Mass. 469, 185 N.E. 369 (1933). 
7142 Mass. 6, 6 N.E. 766 (1886). This case was decided on somewhat similar 
facts but does not contain a satisfactory discussion of the problem. 
8 Restatement of Conflict of Laws §349, at p. 430, which states: "The validity and 
effect of a transfer of a negotiable instrument are determined by the law of the 
place where the instrument is at the time of its transfer." 
99 C.J.S., Banks and Banking §214 (1938). 
§1O.2. 1 Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175,21 Sup. Ct. 551,45 L. Ed. 804 (1900). See also 
Cohen v. Cohen, 319 Mass. 31, 64 N.E.2d 689, 163 A.L.R. 362 (1946); Coe v. Coe, 316 
Mass. 423, 55 N.E.2d 702 (1944). 
2 Restatement of Judgments §§5, 11. 
31958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 225,147 N.E.2d 828. 
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the child of the marriage and was party to an agreement to set up a 
trust fund for the support of this child. 
Dennis remarried and lived in New York. Nine years after the Mas-
sachusetts divorce Dennis died and the petitioner filed a claim in the 
Surrogate Court in New York claiming a widow's share in the estate of 
her deceased former husband. The New York court stayed the pro-
ceedings pending a determination of the marital status of the petitioner 
in the courts of this Commonwealth. 
The petition to vacate was based upon the alleged fraud of Dennis 
which was averred to have been exercised both upon the Massachusetts 
court and the petitioner. The Probate Court dismissed the petition to 
vacate and this result was upheld by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
In refusing to vacate the divorce decree, the Court took the position 
that the petitioner's participation in her husband's conduct would not 
alone bar relief. There is lack of jurisdiction which carinot be cured 
by any conduct of the parties nor by their consent and which consti-
tutes a defect that may be brought to the attention of the court at any 
stage of the proceedings. 
One would expect that the Court would have gone on to hold the 
divorce decree invalid. Instead the Court applied a doctrine of long 
standing in the courts of this Commonwealth, to the effect that events 
occurring after the granting of the decree may have the consequence of 
barring one in the position of the petitioner from maintaining any pro-
ceeding to set aside the decree. Specifically the Court pointed out that 
the remarriage of the parties or either of them thereby affecting the 
status and rights of innocent third parties has been held to be a bar to 
the proceeding to vacate the divorce decree. The Court quotes at some 
length from the opinion in Langewald v. Langewald,4 which bases the 
result "not upon the ground of a strict estoppel, but because her own 
conduct amounts to a connivance at, or acquiescence in, his subsequent 
marriage." 
Perhaps a more adequate statement of the doctrine is that found in 
Chapman v. Chapman,5 in which the Court said: 
[w]here a party has invoked the jurisdiction of a court and the 
other party has voluntarily appeared and submitted thereto, it is 
not consonant with ordinary conceptions of justice to countenance 
an attempt at repudiation of that jurisdiction, especially when the 
attempt would involve the receiving of considerable sums of 
money without consideration, the confession of bigamy and the un-
settlement of other domestic relations presumably entered upon in 
innocent reliance upon the jurisdiction of such court. 
The Court refrained from discussing the effect of the mere lapse of 
time without any other change in the position of the parties or whether 
the death of the party obtaining the decree would have affected the 
right to attack the decree. 
4234 Mass. 269, 125 N.E. 566, 39 A.L.R. 674 (1920). 
5224 Mass. 427,434, Il3 N.E. 359, 362 (1916). 
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The result is that the petitioner was precluded from both direct at-
tack by the Massachusetts decision and from collateral attack by the 
ruling of the New York court. Under the doctrine of Sherrer v. 
Sherrer,6 and Johnson v. Muelberger,7 the decree of divorce in Mas-
sachusetts was entitled to full faith and credit in, the pending New 
York proceedings, the former wife being foreclosed from any collateral 
attack in a sister state.8 
By thus insulating the local decree, Massachusetts in its utilization of 
a kind of estoppel 9 in the interests of finality, illuminates the in-
congruity that 
marriage may not be dissolved by consent of the parties, but they 
can, by their consent accomplish the dissolution of the marriage tie 
by appearing in a court foreign to their domicil and wholly want-
ing in jurisdiction :md may subsequently compel the courts of 
their domicil to give effect to such judgment.1o 
The Court does not say, however, that the estoppel would cure the 
jurisdictional defect as to other parties. In an effort to solidify the 
validity of foreign decrees" estoppel might well be used to bar attack by 
a participating spouse and a second spouse except when a fraud is 
practiced on the first spouse with respect to the nature of divorce.11 
There is a tendency to consider children as strangers to the decree, not 
imputing an estoppel of the parties to them.12 In Johnson v. Muel-
berger,13 however, a child was precluded from attack in a sister state, 
indicating that the standing of the child and the nature of the child's 
interest would be determined by the standing accorded the child by the 
divorce-granting state.14 A child's legitimacy, however, and a right to 
support ought not to depend upon an estoppel raised against the 
parties to the divorce.15 These rights and other pre-existing interests 
6334 U.S. 343, 68 Sup. Ct. 1087,92 L. Ed. 1429 (1948). 
7340 U.S. 581, 7I Sup. Ct. 474, 95 L. Ed. 552 (1951). 
8 See cases cited in notes 6 and 7 supra, holding that a divorce predicated upon a 
hearing in which both parties have appeared in person or by attorney is entitled to 
full faith and credit. 
9 Although the Court refrained from using the word estoppel in describing the 
effect of Mrs. Dennis's conduct, most courts have used the word estoppel in describ-
ing the legal effect of this type of conduct. See Note, Enforcement by Estoppel of 
Divorce without Domicil: Toward a Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, 61 Harv. 
L. Rev. 326 (1948). Other courts have been careful, however, to point out that the 
estoppel described was not a true estoppel. See Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 
N.E.2d 290 (1940). 
10 Note Old Colony Trust Co. v. Porter, 324 Mass. 581, 88 N.E.2d 135 (1949), cited 
by the Court in the Dennis case, in which executors were allowed to attack collater-
ally a decree, even though principles of res judicata bind original parties and thus 
limit them to methods of direct attack. 
11 Sampson v. Sampson, 223 Mass. 451, 112 N.E. 84 (1916). 
12 See In re Lindgren, 293 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E.2d 849 (1944) (child not barred by 
suit of parents to challenge Florida domicil). 
13340 U.S. 581, 7I Sup. Ct. 474, 95 L. Ed. 552 (1951). 
14 See Johnson v. Muelberger, note 13 supra. 
15 See Weiss, A Flight on the Fantasy of Estoppel in Foreign Divorce, 50 Colum. 
L. Rev. 409 (1950); Baer, Law of Divorce Fifteen Years After Williams v. North 
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are not extinguished by the divorce decree. Otherwise due process 
objections might well arise when full faith and credit requirements dis-
appear. 
§lO.3. Enforcement of an alimony decree. In De Gategno v. De 
Gategno,1 the Supreme Judicial Court for the first time interpreted the 
amendment to G.L., c. 208, §35, enacted by Acts of 1950, c. 57. The 
Court held that the effect of the amendment is to authorize the Probate 
Courts of this Commonwealth to enforce the alimony decrees of foreign 
courts. Appreciation of the effect of the De Gategno case requires a 
brief glance at the background of the cases and statutes which preceded 
the 1950 amendment. 
Weidman v. Weidman2 held that the Probate Courts of this Com-
monwealth were without jurisdiction to enforce the alimony decrees of 
foreign courts. Shortly after this case, the General Court amended 
G.L., c. 215, §6 by the enactment of Acts of 1933, c. 237, §1, which con-
ferred jurisdiction on the Probate Courts "to enforce foreign judg-
ments for the support of a wife." 
In Sellman v. Seltman,3 the Court held that this amendment did not 
apply to situations in which the marital relationship had been termi-
nated, for in such cases the former wife had an adequate remedy at 
law. The Court said, "That it was the intention of the Legislature that 
the operation of the statute was to be limited to cases where the marital 
relationship still continued is further demonstrated by the fact that in 
the absence of such relationship a remedy at law would be available 
and adequate." 
In the De Gategno case it appeared that Mrs. De Gategno, a resident 
of New York, brought a petition in equity in the Berkshire Probate 
Court under G.L., c. 208, §35 against the respondent, her former hus-
band, to secure enforcement of a Nevada divorce decree which con-
tained a provision for weekly payments for the support of Mrs. 
De Gategno and the child. Beginning in 1941, the petitioner and the 
respondent had been domiciled in New York. In 1948, the petitioner 
went to Nevada and obtained a divorce in that state. The respondent 
entered an appearance in the divorce proceeding. The Nevada court 
incorporated into the divorce decree a property and support agreement 
made by the parties. The respondent complied with the support terms 
of the Nevada decree until May of 1954, after which he made no fur-
ther support payments. 
The petitioner prayed that respondent be ordered to comply with 
the Nevada decree and pay all sums in arrears thereunder. The re-
spondent demurred, and after a hearing, the Probate Court entered an 
order requiring the respondent to pay the sums in arrears under the 
terms of the Nevada decree. The respondent appealed from the order 
Carolina, 36 N.C.L. Rev. 265 (1958); Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 326 (1947). Contra. 
Note, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 833 (1950). 
§1O.3. 1336 Mass. 426, 146 N.E.2d 497 (1957). 
2274 Mass. 118, 174 N.E. 206 (1931). 
3 3~2 Mass. 650, 79 N.E.2d 11 (1948). 
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overruling his demurrer and from the final decree of the Probate 
Court. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the interlocutory and 
final decrees. 
The problem presented to the Court was the interpretation of Acts 
of 1950, c. 57, which provided: "The Court may enforce decrees, in-
cluding foreign decrees, for allowance, alimony or allowance in the 
nature of alimony, in the same manner as it may enforce decrees in 
equity." In the De Gategno case, the Court said that the purpose of 
the addition of the italicized words, was undoubtedly to remove the 
effect of the decision in Seltman v. Seltman, so as to authorize the Pro-
bate Courts of the Commonwealth to enforce the alimony decrees of 
foreign courts. Accordingly, an ex-husband who desires to escape the 
payment of alimony by crossing state lines will be well-advised to seek 
refuge elsewhere than in Massachusetts. 
Thus the efforts of the General Court to overcome the hardship 
arising from the inadequacy of the remedy at law and the impractica-
bility of extradition have received the judicial approval of our court of 
last resort.4 
§lOA. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. Phillips 
v. Phillipsl is a case arising under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement 
of Support Act.2 The proceeding was initiated in the Superior Court 
of Cumberland County, Maine, by the State of Maine Department of 
Health and Welfare on behalf of the petitioner, the divorced wife of 
the respondent, to seek support for their four minor children from the 
respondent, a resident of Massachusetts. Although the petition filed in 
the Superior Court in Maine was not in the record before the Supreme 
Judicial Court in this Commonwealth, the Court took the position that 
it must be assumed that the petition complied with the requirements 
of the uniform act. The procedure under the uniform act provides 
that the court in which the proceeding is initiated shall forward cer-
tified copies of the petition to the court where jurisdiction of the re-
spondent is obtained (in this case the Third District Court of Bristol).3 
4 See, on this point, Monsman, Equitable Enforcement of Foreign Alimony, 34 
Mass. L.Q. No.4, p. 9 (1949), wherein it is pointed out that the remedy at law, i.e., 
execution, is inadequate because it is easy for the husband to secrete all his personal 
property or to give it to trusted friends. Extradition is also impractical because it 
uproots the husband from the state where he has set up a business or is employed 
and returns him to a state where he has no employment and no desire to be. 
§1O.4. l336 Mass. 561, 146 N.E.2d 919 (1958). 
2 G.L., c. 27M. 
3 The procedure to be followed in enforcing the duty of support under the uni· 
form act is set out in G.L., c. 273A, §§6-9. The one seeking support commences the 
action by filing a petition stating the name and address of the respondent and all 
other pertinent information in the District Court within whose jurisdiction he or she 
is a resident. This court then holds a hearing to determine if the petition states a 
cause of action and if a court of a responding state may obtain jurisdiction over the 
respondent or his property. If it so finds it then sends a certified copy of the peti-
tion, any evidence which it has, and a certificate of its findings to the court of the 
responding state which, upon receipt, dockets the cause, obtains jurisdiction of the 
respondent, schedules a hearing and if so disposed assigns a probation officer to the 
case. 
6
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The only evidence came from the respondent, who was present under 
summons and was ordered to take the stand over his objection.4 The 
District Court made a support order. The Appellate Division dis-
missed the report and its order was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial 
Court. 
The respondent's main argument was that the uniform act is crimi-
nal in nature and thus he should not have been compelled to take the 
stand and testify against himself. This argument was rejected by the 
Court which said: "This contention cannot be sustained. The pro-
ceedings were civil in character." 5 
Though the Court gave no reasons for reaching this conclusion the 
decision is sound. The distinction between a civil and a criminal stat-
ute is that the prime purpose of the latter is punishment and deter-
rence, while the purpose of a civil statute is the adjustment of the rights 
of the parties as between themselves with respect to the wrong al-
leged. This principle has long been recognized in Massachusetts. 
The Court has stated: 
In the present case, we think the action is purely remedial, and 
has none of the characteristics of a penal prosecution. All dam-
ages for neglect or breach of duty operate to a certain extent as 
punishment, but the distinction is, that it is prosecuted for the 
purpose of punishment, and to deter others from offending in a 
like manner .... [T]he one is remedial and seeks indemnity 
against a party made liable by law to repair the loss he has oc-
casioned, the other is penal and seeks to punish the party for the 
violation of a duty imposed by law ... 6 
The uniform act is designed to provide a procedure to enforce the 
obligation to support dependents which rests upon one who has re-
moved himself to a state other than that in which the obligation arose 
and where the dependents are to be found.7 The remedy thus pro-
vided by this statute is in addition to and not in substitution of already 
existing procedures. While the obligor of the duty to support remains 
within the state where the obligees of the duty reside, the local law is 
adequate to secure enforcement of the duty. It is when the obligor 
leaves that jurisdiction, whether to avoid the obligation or for other 
reasons, that the uniform act may be brought into play so as, in effect, 
to extend the enforcement of the duty across state lines. In fact the 
statute was intended to provide a more facile procedural device to solve 
the social problem created by the great increase in the number of run-
4 The District Court ruled that the pleadings are not evidence and hence the 
petition is not to be considered evidence on behalf of the petitioner. 
5336 Mass. 561, 562, 146 N.E.2d 919, 920 (1958). 
6 Reed v. The Inhabitants of Northfield, 13 Pick. 94, 100·101 (Mass. 1832). 
7 Keene v. Toth, 335 Mass. 591, 141 N.E.2d 509 (1957), discussed in 1957 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §§19.7, 21.1. It should be noted that while there has not been a judicial 
determination as to which dependents are concerned by the act, G.L., c. 273A, §l de· 
fines obligee as "any person to whom a duty of support is owed." It would seem, 
therefore, that the act is broad enough to include all legal dependents. 
7
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away husbands seeking to evade their legal obligation to support their 
dependents.8 
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act, which has been adopted by all forty-eight states, the com-
mon method of enforcing the duty of support against the fugitive hus-
band was through criminal sanctions and extradition. In some states 
the extradition feature has been retained in their version of the uni-
form act. In Massachusetts, however, the extradition provision is 
omitted. Our statute provides: 
The Court, when the Commonwealth is the responding state, may 
subject the respondent to such terms and conditions as it deems 
proper to assure compliance with its orders, and may require the 
respondents to make payments at specified intervals to a probation 
officer assigned by the Court to the same extent as is provided by 
law for contempt in any suit or proceeding.9 
Even in those jurisdictions in which the extradition provision has 
been retained, the best authority extant considers the reciprocal law to 
be nevertheless civil in character or at most of a penal nature falling 
somewhere between the civil and criminal but partaking principally of 
a civil nature. As one writer has stated: "It is submitted that the act 
is civil or equitable procedurally with criminal penalties as a last re-
sort;" 10 The act thus is chiefly civil in character, containing in some 
jurisdictions criminal provisions, probably separable, to be employed 
only in the event of the failure in particular cases of the civil pro-
visions. Thus, while in the past the criminal remedy provided the 
sole means of enforcement, under the uniform act, when they are re-
tained they are relegated to a subordinate role which will be probably 
only that of a minatory function. 
A recent amendment to the uniform act should be noted.11 It pro-
vides that service of process under the act may be made by an officer 
authorized to serve criminal process. This amendment, however, in 
no way affects the proceedings and adds little or no weight to the con-
tention that the statute is criminal. 
A second contention by the respondent was that the judge erred in 
denying his request for a ruling that the burden is on the petitioner to 
prove the allegation in her petition. The Supreme Judicial Court 
held that even if the request was technically correct, its denial did not 
harm the respondent. "The case can be proved out of the respondent's 
own mouth." 12 
The statute not being criminal, no right of confrontation exists. 
The uniform act requires no more than that the court of the respond-
8 For an excellent discussion of the unifonn act, see Note, 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 261 
(1956). See also Note, 15 Montana L. Rev. 40 (1954). 
9 C.L., c. 27M, §12. 
10 Note, 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 261 (1956). 
11 Acts of 1957, c. 74, amending C.L., c. 273A, §9. 
12 336 Mass. 561, 564,146 N.E.2d 919,921 (1958). 
8
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ing state shall hear evidence submitted to it by the parties. Thus the 
petitioner may use means of establishing her case other than her own 
testimony, as was done in the Phillips case. Another means can be 
suggested. This would be the taking of her own testimony by deposi-
tion and forwarding it to the responding state. In this case, however, 
it would seem that notice to the respondent would be required in or-
der to render the deposition admissible into evidence. Of course she 
can also appear in person and testify, but one of the purposes of the 
uniform act is to avoid the necessity for this course.13 In a word, no 
reason is seen why petitioner may not avail herself of all the para-
phernalia provided for proof in any civil matter. 
13 General Laws, c. 273A, §3 provides that the duty to support binds the obligor 
regardless of the presence or residence of the obligee. 
9
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